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From January 1919 until a truce came into effect on 11 July 1921, a state of undeclared 
war existed in some areas of Ireland between guerilla units of the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), representing the independence aspirations of militant Irish nationalism, and the 
forces of the British Crown who were charged with the task of restoring law and order in 
this troubled part of the United Kingdom. With neither a state of war nor martial law 
being declared by the British authorities in Ireland – martial law did come eventually in 
December 1920/January 1921 but applied only to eight counties in the southern-most part 
of the country – the military was confined largely to a supporting role, leaving the civil 
administration based at Dublin Castle heavily reliant on the enforcement powers of the 
Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) in its efforts to curb the insurgent Irish nationalists. From 
the IRA’s perspective, the RIC was seen as ‘an instrument designed to overawe in every 
locality any opposition to the regime it served.’1 In a response to this apparent menace, 
early in 1919 the IRA began a campaign of intimidation against officers of the RIC, who 
were subjected to threats, violent attacks and ostracizing of their families from the local 
community. Other locals who dared to show support or even sympathy for RIC families 
thereafter were similarly intimidated. The IRA killed 18 policemen altogether over the 
twelve-month period ending in December 1919.2 Six months later, police casualties had 
risen to a total of 55 killed and a further 74 wounded, indicating a considerable escalation 
early in 1920 in the IRA’s campaign of violence against the RIC.3  
 
The plight of those serving with the RIC in this period was defined pessimistically 
by the military command in Ireland in the following terms: 
 
The R.I.C. were at this time distributed in small detachments throughout the country, 
quartered in “barracks,” which consisted, in the vast majority of cases, of small houses 
adjoining other buildings, quite indefensible and entirely at the mercy of disloyal 
inhabitants. The ranks of the force had already been depleted by murders, and many men, 
through intimidation of themselves or more often of their families, had been induced to 
resign. Although, in the main, a loyal body of men their moral (sic) had diminished, and 
only two courses were open to their detachments; to adopt a policy of laisser faire and 
live, or actively to enforce law and order and be in hourly danger of murder.4 
 
The British authorities responded to this situation in an extraordinary fashion by advertis-
ing in England for British ex-servicemen firstly, and then later for ex-officers, to join the 
RIC and bring their recent experience of weapons and warfare to what had formerly been 
a distinctly Irish police force. Known respectively as the ‘Black and Tans’ and the 
‘Auxiliaries’, these two elements of the RIC became infamous for utilizing their experi-
ence of war to terrorize the civilian population of Ireland, especially the Catholic Irish 
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majority, in the name of the Crown and supposedly in the cause of law, order and British 
justice. How these police militias came into being, their respective roles in Ireland and 
the legacy that may be attributed to them are matters that will be considered in this paper.  
 
The idea for the recruitment of the Black and Tans has been attributed, in recent times, to 
Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson who, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), is 
said to have convinced Prime Minister David Lloyd George to favour such reinforcement 
of the RIC.5 This claim is based on Wilson having noted in his diary after a Cabinet meet-
ing on 13 January 1920, that ‘the state of Ireland is terrible…. I urge with all my force the 
necessity for doubling the police and not employing the military.’6 Yet the decision to 
recruit the Black and Tans and, indeed, the beginning of the process of their recruitment, 
actually predated this Cabinet meeting by some months. In fact, Cabinet had approved an 
expansion of the RIC as early as 7 October 1919 on advice from the Lord Lieutenant, Sir 
John French, and the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Sir Ian Macpherson, who themselves 
were responding to an earlier suggestion of 19 September 1919 from the General Officer 
Commanding the British Army in Ireland, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Shaw, for the 
police force to be expanded via recruitment of a special force of volunteer British ex-
servicemen.7 The authority for recruitment of such a force was issued by the office of the 
Inspector-General of the RIC on 11 November. It was followed almost immediately by 
press advertisements calling on men prepared to ‘face a rough and dangerous task’ to call 
at any of a number of recruiting stations established initially in London, Liverpool, 
Birmingham and Glasgow, and complemented by the activities of a special recruiting 
officer, Major Fleming, who held the rank of Chief Inspector in the RIC.8 Thus the 
initiative for the Black and Tans came from the British authorities in Ireland and not from 
those in London. Even the sobriquet, Black and Tans, was an Irish rather than an English 
invention, with the mixed uniform of these new police recruits – dark green RIC caps and 
tunics with khaki trousers - reminding Irish observers of a famous pack of hounds from 
Limerick of the same name. 
 
But London and the Secretary of State for War, Sir Winston Churchill, in particular, were 
clearly responsible for a further initiative in the process of militarizing the RIC, namely 
the creation of the Auxiliary Division. Churchill planted the seed of an idea in this regard 
at a conference of ministers in London on 11 May 1920 when, in proposing an alternative 
to substantial reinforcements for the Army in Ireland, he suggested raising a special force 
of 8,000 ex-soldiers to reinforce the RIC instead.9 Furthermore, he persisted with his 
proposal for ‘the prompt raising of a special Corps of Gendarmerie ... in aid of the Royal 
Irish Constabulary during the emergency period’ despite the clear opposition of a military 
committee of review appointed by Cabinet and chaired by the new GOC in Ireland, 
General Sir Nevil Macready, which rejected the idea as ‘not feasible’.10 Established in 
July with an initial intake of 500 men known simply as ‘temporary cadets’, the Auxiliary 
Division, RIC, comprising ex-officers rather than ex-soldiers as originally proposed by 
Churchill, would never number more than about 1,500 men overall. But they did exceed 
their more numerous Black and Tan brothers in other respects for, in addition to being 
paid twice the ten shillings per day received by the latter for service in Ireland, the 
Auxiliaries were considered by Irish adversaries who knew them well to be more 
ruthless, more dangerous ‘and far more intelligent than the Tans.’11 
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In 1919, the RIC was responsible for maintaining over 1,300 barracks of various sizes 
throughout the country with a force 9,300 strong. The IRA began a campaign of attacks 
on these barracks starting in January 1920, which forced the closure and evacuation of 
many smaller, remote stations and the concentration of police forces in fewer defensible 
locations. In the first six months of this campaign, IRA guerillas captured and destroyed 
16 defended RIC barracks, damaged another 29, and burnt 424 abandoned buildings to 
the ground.12 Regular RIC members at this time were armed with Martini-Metford 
carbines rather than the military issue Lee-Enfield rifles, though they also had access to 
recently ordered supplies of revolvers, Colt automatic pistols and hand grenades. But 
their training and experience in the use of such weapons was minimal and, in any event, 
many experienced police constables regarded them as encumbrances to an effective 
relationship with the local community.13 
 
The first Black and Tan recruits who began arriving in Ireland from late-March 1920 – in 
many instances with their wives or other female companions – went initially to a staging 
area at the RIC’s Phoenix Park depot in Dublin. From here, they were distributed in small 
detachments amongst the RIC barracks as reinforcements to bolster their defences.14 The 
Black and Tans had an intake of 646 recruits altogether in the first six months of 1920.15 
This would increase substantially thereafter, with a total intake of about 7,000 by the time 
hostilities ceased in July 1921.16 Following the appointment of Major-General Hugh 
Tudor, an artillery officer and Churchill’s personal choice as the new Chief of Police in 
Ireland from 15 May 1920, initiatives were taken to: 
• further the process of evacuation and concentration of police forces in barracks 
which could be readily defended against attacks by the IRA;  
• rearm the RIC with Lee-Enfield rifles and Lewis guns to enhance police firepower 
against the IRA; and 
• establish an RIC transport division with expert personnel, replace the Ford vans 
acquired in 1919 with more suitable Lancia and Crossley vehicles and, with these 
means, provide for a mobile force of mainly Black and Tans to conduct regular 
patrols of the country in order to harass and disrupt local IRA guerillas and their 
supporters and, as Tudor told Churchill, ‘help to re-establish the ordinary law.’17 
Unfortunately, while they were supposedly subordinate in their actions to the authority of 
the RIC’s own divisional commissioners, the Black and Tans seemed for the most part to 
behave in a patently undisciplined manner. According to one Irish observer: 
 
They had neither religion nor morals, they used foul language, they had the old soldier’s 
talent for dodging and scrounging, they spoke in strange accents, called the Irish 
“natives”, associated with low company, stole from each other, sneered at the customs of 
the country, drank to excess and put sugar on their porridge.18 
 
Even worse, though, was their tendency to engage in the wanton destruction of property, 
indiscriminate shooting and violence and, on occasions, even deliberate murder, in their 
apparent quest ‘to administer random terror.’19 The lasting image of the Black and Tans 
as brutes derives from this kind of outrageous behaviour on their part which was anything 
but conducive to the restoration of law and order in Ireland. 
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Most of all, however, the Black and Tans became infamous for their method of retaliation 
or reprisal for attacks made upon them and their RIC colleagues by IRA units. One of the 
more notorious of the Black and Tans’ reprisals occurred on 20/21 September 1920 at 
Balbriggan, a small town about 20 miles north of Dublin, following the assassination of 
the local head constable of the RIC, named Burke, and the wounding of his brother. 
When word of this attack reached the Black and Tans at their Gormanstown depot just a 
few miles down the road, they immediately set off in force to vent their rage on the 
supposedly culpable inhabitants of Balbriggan. Upon arrival, they proceeded to sack the 
town, shot dead two IRA suspects, left four public and nineteen private houses destroyed, 
along with an English-owned hosiery factory, and caused damage to a further thirty 
homes. A similar reprisal took place the following day, after the death of five Black and 
Tans shot with flat-nosed bullets in an IRA ambush at Rineen in west Clare. Incensed by 
the sight of the horrific wounds inflicted on their comrades, regular RIC officers and 
Black and Tans ran amuck, killing a man in a hay-cart and burning down eight houses at 
nearby Milltown Malbay, then moving on to Ennistymon where they shot and killed an-
other man and a twelve-year-old boy, as well as burning four houses and a drapery shop. 
They finished up by setting fire to the town hall and seven houses at Lahinch, with a man 
suspected of involvement in the IRA ambush party being burned alive inside one of these 
houses. These were examples of a pattern or surge of apparently spontaneous reprisals by 
the Black and Tans that would continue for months to come, during which it was 
common in many Irish towns for homes to be burnt, shops and creameries to be destroyed 
and people suspected of being IRA members or sympathizers to be abducted and killed 
without ceremony.20 Such outrageous behaviour on the part of the Black and Tans 
captured the attention of the press in Ireland, England and overseas – especially in the 
United States – with the British Government being accused by its critics of conniving in a 
systematic program of barbaric reprisals against the Irish people.21 
 
Prominent among the many critics of the Black and Tans was the King, George V, who in 
May 1921 told the Chief Secretary’s wife, Lady Margery Greenwood, that ‘he hated the 
idea of the ‘Black and Tans”.’22 In expressing his abhorrence of these police militiamen, 
the king echoed the sentiments of many of his subjects, including a British army officer 
serving in Ireland who wrote to Sir Henry Wilson in September 1920 complaining that 
‘we are importing crowds of undisciplined men who are just terrorizing the country.’23 
Both Wilson and the GOC in Ireland, General Macready, were two of the more strident 
critics of the Black and Tans fearing rightly, as it turned out in some instances, that the 
bad example set by the police militias might influence impressionable young soldiers and 
contribute to a breakdown in military discipline.24 In England, meanwhile, a London 
based Anti-Reprisals Association was formed in November 1920, with an executive 
committee including Joseph Kenworthy MP, Liberal member for Hull, and the well-
known author, G. K. Chesterton. They petitioned politicians and other prominent citizens 
in Britain to join in a campaign to embarrass Lloyd George’s government over the 
misdeeds of the Black and Tans and ‘compel them to abandon a policy, which is as 
fatuous as it is wicked.’25 So adverse was the publicity subsequently generated in the 
British and world press, that it was later hailed by Sinn Fein’s Director of Propaganda, 
Desmond Fitzgerald, as having ‘been most damaging to England’s prestige.’26 Eventually 
even the Prime Minister, whom many considered responsible for this situation, came to 
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realize that the Black and Tans were getting out of control and threatening the govern-
ment they had been sent to Ireland to support. So he wrote to the Chief Secretary, Sir 
Hamar Greenwood, on 25 February 1921 and insisted that ‘the violence and indiscipline 
which undoubtedly characterise certain units in the R.I.C. should be terminated in the 
most prompt and drastic manner.’27 
 
In summing up their situation at this point in time, Mark Sturgis, an Under Secretary at 
Dublin Castle, noted in his diary: ‘The Black & Tans have done fine work and could have 
been ideal for the job if some of them hadn’t taken a completely wrong view of their 
functions….’28 Sturgis was not a lone voice in claiming to have seen some good result 
from the presence of the Black and Tans in Ireland. In October 1920, for example, they 
received the sincere and grateful thanks of the Templemore town council in Tipperary for 
their decisive role in curbing a reprisal against the town by British soldiers reacting to the 
death of three comrades in an IRA ambush nearby.29 And on Armistice Day, November 
11, 1920, Sturgis recorded seeing the ‘Dublin Crowd’ cheer a lorry load of Black and 
Tans at College Green for having observed two minutes silence, at attention, in memory 
of those who had died in the Great War. ‘They were generally a very fine lot of men,’ 
according to Major A. E. Percival, a British military intelligence officer based in County 
Cork, who concluded that they ‘would have done well under other conditions.’30 William 
Wylie, the Law Adviser at Dublin Castle observed a ‘vast improvement’ in their manner 
and discipline by June 1921 and lamented ‘that if they had behaved all through as they 
behave now the result would be … very different ….’31 But such regrets could not alter 
the fact that, irrespective of their hard won achievement in regaining some ground for the 
RIC against the IRA, the Black and Tans, by their own outrageous actions, had lost the 
equally important battle for public opinion in Britain and Ireland.  
 
Though sometimes confused or misrepresented as being much the same as the Black and 
Tans, the Auxiliaries were in fact a different, distinct element of the RIC.32 Certainly, in 
the early stage of their service in Ireland, they wore the same Glengarry caps, carried .45 
Webley pistols in open black leather holsters and had bandoliers for their ammunition, as 
the Black and Tans did. But they were distinguished by their officer-style khaki tunics 
and trousers – later replaced with a dark blue uniform – worn with high leather boots or 
leggings rather than the puttees common among the non-commissioned ranks from which 
the Black and Tans had been drawn. And Auxiliaries had the letters TC, for Temporary 
Cadet, emblazoned on the shoulder straps of their tunics as another distinguishing feature. 
They were also organized differently to the Black and Tans, with the Auxiliary Division 
of the RIC (ADRIC) being formed into companies for dispatch to regions where the IRA 
was particularly troublesome. These companies varied in strength from around 100 men 
in some, 70-80 in others, to as low as 44 in K Company situated in Cork city. They were 
led by former military officers of the rank of colonel or major and usually comprised 
three sections commanded by captains. Of the eighteen companies eventually formed, 
four were located in Dublin, another four in the county of Cork, with the others being 
distributed in counties in the centre, west and south of the island. Their presence in the 
north, in the loyalist stronghold of Ulster, apparently was not considered to be necessary. 
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The first recruits to the ADRIC began arriving in Ireland towards the end of July 1920 
and, after a six-week course on policing at the RIC’s Curragh training centre, became 
operational in September. With their headquarters at Beggar’s Bush barracks in Dublin, 
the scattered companies of Auxiliaries operated under the overall command of Brigadier-
General Frank Crozier. They were well supplied with Crossley tenders to enhance their 
mobility and apparently well suited to the task of mounting raids and searches for arms, 
seditious literature and suspect individuals on their own initiative, or in association with 
other RIC or military units. But their methods did much to promote fear and indignation 
among the civilian population, as Tom Barry of the IRA’s No.3 Cork Brigade recalled: 
 
They had a special technique. Fast lorries of them would come roaring into a village, the 
occupants would jump out, firing shots and ordering all the inhabitants out of doors. No 
exceptions were allowed. Men and women, old and young, the sick and decrepit were 
lined up against the walls with their hands up, questioned and searched. No raid was ever 
carried out by these ex-officers without their beating up with the butt ends of their 
revolvers, at least a half-dozen people. They were no respecters of persons and seemed to 
particularly dislike the Catholic priests.33 
 
And it was not long too before the Auxiliaries, like their Black and Tan brothers, became 
infamous world-wide for outrageous reprisals against the civilian population in retaliation 
for losses suffered in engagements with the IRA. The first notable reprisal took place on 
November 21, 1920 – hereafter known as ‘Bloody Sunday’ – following the assassination 
in Dublin of twelve suspected British intelligence officers by the IRA, the wounding of 
five others and the cold-blooded killing of two Auxiliaries who, unfortunately for them, 
happened to be passing by at the time. The deaths of the two Auxiliaries - Section Leader 
Gaimon and Temporary Cadet Morris – were the first fatalities suffered by the ADRIC. 
Later that day, in retaliation for these killings, I Company of the ADRIC, which was 
supposed to take part in a combined operation with the military and other RIC units to 
search the crowd at a Croke Park football match, arrived early and took the opportunity to 
shoot into the crowd, killing twelve civilians and wounding dozens more. While some 
commentators have denied that this action was actually a reprisal by the Auxiliaries, the 
ADRIC commander, General Crozier, had no doubt that it was, recording in his diary: 
‘Croke Park massacre. Many murder’d by R.I.C.’34 The most astounding reprisal of all, 
however, occurred on the night of 11 December 1920 in the city of Cork. After an attack 
by the IRA earlier that day at Dillon’s Cross in which thirteen Auxiliaries were seriously 
wounded, the members of K Company of the ADRIC took it upon themselves to retaliate 
by looting, burning and destroying a substantial part of the city centre. This was an event 
so devastating, that it forced the government to order a formal military inquiry which, in 
turn, compelled the Prime Minister to demand an end to such outrageous behaviour on 
the part of these rampant RIC militiamen, because it was ‘alienating public opinion in 
Great Britain from the present methods of restoring law and order in Ireland.’35 
 
Both the Auxiliaries and the Black & Tans did substantially bolster the ranks of the RIC 
and take the fight to the IRA in many disputed areas. But any success gained here in 
subduing militant nationalism was more than overshadowed by the reprisals surge against 
the civilian population, which provided Sinn Fein with a propaganda gift and turned 
British public opinion, including that of the King and many leading MPs, against Lloyd 
George’s government. The government also lost patience with them in the end, regarding 
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these RIC militias as being almost more trouble than they were worth. Nonetheless, they 
were troublesome for the IRA too and, on the Irish side, the Anglo-Irish War has gone 
down in history as the ‘Tan War’ in recognition of the particularly bitter nature of the 
conflict between the RIC militias and the IRA. Given that the RIC almost certainly could 
not have held the line against the IRA without these reinforcements, the term ‘Tan War’ 
does seem appropriate as a description of this particular aspect of the Anglo-Irish War. 
 
The RIC militias provided an early and perhaps original example of what we have seen 
elsewhere more recently in Northern Ireland with the Royal Ulster Constabulary, in Chile 
under General Augusto Pinochet in the 1980s, and in Kossovo during Yugoslav President 
Slobodan Milosevic’s tenure in the 1990s. Auxiliaries were also used in their original 
form by British authorities striving to curb guerilla forces in Palestine in the 1920s, so it 
comes as no real surprise to see similar police militia forces being utilized today by both 
Israel and the Palestine Authority in the Middle East. In each instance as mentioned 
above, the police militias have operated with military support, supposedly in an attempt 
to curb or contain violence on the part of guerilla forces operating under cover of civilian 
populations. And what they have achieved in every case is an escalation of violence 
rather than its diminishment. In none of these cases have the so-called terrorists on the 
guerillas’ side been defeated by the terrorist tactics used by the police. 
 
Dr John Ainsworth 
School of Humanities & Social Science 
Queensland University of Technology 
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